In the book “Radical Markets” by Eric Posner and Glen Weyl, property rights are explored. One conclusion of the authors is that property rights can sometimes become a constraint in the efficiency of markets. In an interesting proposal, Posner and Weyl come up with a system in which you are able to maintain your property rights but are forced to declare publicly how much it is worth to you and pay a proportional tax linked to the worth of the goods you own. You would then, hypothetically, upload those amounts to an app, and anybody would be able to offer a larger amount than what you declared and buy the good form you. Theoretically this would lead to a much more efficient allocation of resources than the equilibrium held through traditional property rights. I interpret this idea as a Walrasian equilibrium where the endowment is composed by property rights, being able to redistribute the property rights can be interpreted as a use of the second welfare theorem, which may lead to a “better” equilibrium.
Dr. Pancs has declared some reservations of this alternative model in his review of said book. You can find the link here: http://focoeconomico.org/2018/04/23/radical-markets-una-resena-por-romans-pancs/
I personally used this review as food for thought. What do you think about this? Do you think this alternative can be explained using a Walrasian model? Let me know.
José Simón Carreño