In class (it is also in the book) we modeled a utility function that depended positively on the proportion of people of the same party as me and negatively on the proportion of people from the competition.
Adapting this model to Mexican politics, eliminating the cost of going to vote and with the proper parameters (such as a gamma <1/2) we could say that PRIistas would put more effort on voting if they believe there is a bigger proportion of PRIistas in the voting lists willing to vote; and they would be less motivated to vote the higher the proportion of PANistas, MORENistas and independent supporters.
However, what happens if I do not like any of the parties running for office? Should I refrain from voting? Should I cancel my vote (null vote) ? Should I vote for my second preference (the party that I dislike the less)? or should I vote strategically to impede my last preference victory? I would like to debate this.
If I assume the Kantian imperative and assume that it is morally valuable to protest by cancelling my vote or even refraining from going to vote maybe I should do that. The day after the election we would see a big percentage of null votes and a big amount of people not voting. This would critically damage the image of legitimacy for the winner.
But this does not happen. Then, should I be forced to vote for someone that I believe does not represent me? Should I give my support to someone I don’t like even if I do not care who wins?
Now consider that people voting strategically assume the Kantian imperatives applies to them too. It is certain that not all people believe on the morality/value of strategic voting. Now, should they refrain from voting?
What is the equilibrium? Should I vote or not?
**assume there are no costs for voting (like transportation) or corrupt incentives to do it (bribery, “despensas”, etc)
**think of this as a moral dilema