Chapter 3


Polyamory or Monogamy, Stable Matchings? (4)
What about the unmatched agents? (2)
TTC New Characterizations? (1)
Two extensions of the TTC algorithm (1)
Stability implies Pareto efficiency. What about the other way around? (1)
Market for Organs - Richard Posner & Gary Becker (9)
Market Design- Taking The Marriage Problem to Stanford (1)
On Caring, Competence, and Chimpanzees (3)
You Request My Home - I Get Your Turn (3)
Core and Stability (2)
Job Matching - salary adjustment process (1)
Application of matching. How Airbnb ensures host preferences? (2)
Market job incentives (2)
PRO-RENAL and pairwise kidney exchange (2)
Jungle Equilibrium at class (1)
Marriage Problem (3)
(Equitable) Top Trading Cycles Mechanism (1)
House Allocation Problem 3.6 (1)
Deferred Acceptance Algorithm Example (1)
The Roomate Welfare Theorem(3.8) (2)
Incentives to lie? (4)
Reflection on Matching, Marketing, Jungle Economics and Morals (4)
The college admission problem (2)
Eduardo’s Office Hour: 6pm, October 3, 2017 (1)
Eduardo’s Office Hour: 6pm, September 26, 2017 (1)