Chapter 3


About the Chapter 3 category (2)
Thickness, safety and congestion, three key aspects in market design (2)
Why tha creation of algorithms is flawed (1)
Property rights (2)
Alvin Roth - Matching Markets (Uber-Airbnb) (1)
DA to think about the football players allocation problem (3)
Can economists make the system for organ transplants more humane and efficient? (1)
The changes in matching markets (2)
Using DA for improving New York City´s high school application process (2)
Egalitarianism and Growth (1)
Externalities in the roommate problem (2)
Is Mexican Medical Residency Mechanism Efficient and Stable? (2)
A little more about the world of kidney exchange (2)
Is Mexican Medical Residency Mechanism Stable? (1)
The least studied matching model in literature (1)
Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings - Practical Example (3)
You Request My Home - I Get Your Turn (6)
Gale’s Top Trading Cycles (TTC) - Practical Example (3)
Kidney Exchange (3)
House allocation with indifferences (1)
Housing allocation problem with tenants, newcomers and vacant houses (1)
Does the increase in rate of divorces signal non stable matches? (3)
A Kidney Exchange Clearing House in New England (1)
TTC adapted to outperform DA in the school choice problem (2)
Incentives to lie? (5)
Q-stable matchings (1)
Is efficiency all we want? Jungle Economy Case (1)
Experiment. Do agents achieve a stable equilibrium in the roommate problem? (1)
Existence of an equilibrium matching from the women´s point of view (1)
Why bumble is better than tinder? (1)