Chapter 3


About the Chapter 3 category (2)
Specific Egalitarianism and The Education Market (2)
Current use of matching markets and opportunities of aplication (2)
How China managed to allocate financial credits in a market with incentives to lie (1)
How hard is to diagnose Pareto inefficiency? (3)
How Economists Could Fix Dating Apps (1)
Chapter 3: from the jungle to design economics (1)
Designing “repugnant” markets vs. banning them (2)
Lying as a dominant strategy and (possible) solutions (1)
Relaxing Power Relations in Serial Dictatorship (4)
Incomplete preferences (2)
What to blame: algorithm or the environment? (1)
An alternative model for TTC (1)
Top Trading Cycles Comparison in Amsterdam's School system (2)
If you're alone on a stable matching, you'll always be alone! (3)
Independence of Irrelevant Rankings (1)
Opt-out organ donation (5)
Thoughts on same-sex marriage game (2)
Black Mirror's "Hang the DJ" : An Utopian Centralized Matching Algorithm (5)
The impact of social power (2)
New challenges in multi-hospital kidney transplants (1)
Evidence of Stable Matchings in Real Life (3)
The Roommate Problem is more stable than you think (1)
Kidney Exchange (2)
An easy exercise of matching in the marriage market (4)
The jungle economy at ITAM (1)
What about one-sided matching? (1)
The First App that Uses TTC to Assign School Admissions in the US (2)
Polyamory or Monogamy, Stable Matchings? (4)
What about the unmatched agents? (2)