Lectures on Microeconomics: The Big Questions Approach
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Chapter 3
About the Chapter 3 category
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Top Trading Cycles Comparison in Amsterdam's School system
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If you're alone on a stable matching, you'll always be alone!
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Independence of Irrelevant Rankings
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Opt-out organ donation
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Thoughts on same-sex marriage game
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Black Mirror's "Hang the DJ" : An Utopian Centralized Matching Algorithm
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The impact of social power
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New challenges in multi-hospital kidney transplants
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Evidence of Stable Matchings in Real Life
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The Roommate Problem is more stable than you think
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Kidney Exchange
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An easy exercise of matching in the marriage market
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The jungle economy at ITAM
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What about one-sided matching?
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The First App that Uses TTC to Assign School Admissions in the US
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Polyamory or Monogamy, Stable Matchings?
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What about the unmatched agents?
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TTC New Characterizations?
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Two extensions of the TTC algorithm
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Stability implies Pareto efficiency. What about the other way around?
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Market for Organs - Richard Posner & Gary Becker
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Market Design- Taking The Marriage Problem to Stanford
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On Caring, Competence, and Chimpanzees
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You Request My Home - I Get Your Turn
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Core and Stability
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Job Matching - salary adjustment process
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Application of matching. How Airbnb ensures host preferences?
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Market job incentives
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PRO-RENAL and pairwise kidney exchange
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